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ABSTRACT 
  We argue that Congress should remake the United States Supreme 
Court in the U.S. courts’ of appeals image by increasing the size of the 
Court’s membership, authorizing panel decisionmaking, and 
retaining an en banc procedure for select cases. In so doing, Congress 
would expand the Court’s capacity to decide cases, facilitating 
enhanced clarity and consistency in the law as well as heightened 
monitoring of lower courts and the other branches. Remaking the 
Court in this way would not only expand the Court’s decisionmaking 
capacity but also improve the Court’s composition, competence, and 
functioning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he number of cases coming before the Supreme Court grew 
steadily since 1925, while the number of cases the Court decides has 
been in steady decline.”1 
“One of the most striking aspects of the [Supreme Court’s] declining 
plenary docket is that it coincides with an unprecedented expansion 
in the dockets of the lower courts, particularly the United States 
Courts of Appeals. While the Supreme Court’s plenary docket is 
approximately half as large in 2004 as it was in 1986, the dockets of 
the federal circuit courts have increased by 82.4% during that same 
period.”2 
“I do think there’s room for the court to take more cases. They hear 
about half the number of cases they did 25 years ago. There may be 
good reasons for that that I’ll learn if I am confirmed but, just 
 
 1. Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William 
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006). 
 2. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 965–66 (2007) (book review). 
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looking at it from the outside, I think they could contribute more to 
the clarity and uniformity of the law by taking more cases.”3 
Max Weber is nowhere to be found in the Supreme Court 
library, but Thorstein Veblen is probably on the shelves. The current 
Supreme Court—surely among the least active courts in history4—has 
apparently rejected Weber’s “protestant work ethic”5 in favor of 
Veblen’s “conspicuous leisure.”6 
It was not always thus. Historically, the Court decided many 
more cases—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its 
docket—than it has recently. During the 1947 Term, for example, the 
Court decided 143 cases by written, signed opinion (or roughly 11 
percent of its docket); in 1967, it decided 155 cases by written, signed 
opinion (or just over 4 percent of its docket); and in 1987, the Court 
decided 151 cases by written, signed opinion (or about 3 percent of its 
docket).7 This contrasts with the 2007 Term, in which the Court 
decided only 72 cases by written, signed opinion which was less than 1 
percent of its docket.8 
Even though it possesses resources unimaginable to its 
predecessors, including computers, enhanced communication 
 
 3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 337 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts Jr.). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Brust, Supreme Court 2.0, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2008, at 38, 39 (quoting 
Professor Paul Carrington stating that current Supreme Court Justices “don’t have to do too 
much work” and that the job of a Justice is “no sweat”); Philip D. Oliver, Increasing the Size of 
the Court as a Partial but Clearly Constitutional Alternative, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 405, 411, 412 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington 
eds., 2006) (observing that “the job of justice seems much easier than in the recent past” and 
describing the position as “cushy”). 
 5. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Dover Publ’ns 2003) (1904). 
 6. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 29 (Modern Library 
2001) (1899) (describing “conspicuous leisure” as the “abstention from productive work”). 
 7. See J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 1947, at I; J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 1967, at II; J. SUP. 
CT. U.S., Oct. Term 1987, at II.  
 8. We use the term “case” in the conventional sense to mean issued decisions, treating 
each opinion of the Court as one case. In its own statistics, the Court treats opinions that resolve 
multiple docket numbers as that number of cases. See Statistics as of June 27, 2008, J. SUP. CT. 
U.S., Oct. Term 2007, at II, available at http:www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/journal/ 
jnl07.pdf (reporting that 1,614 paid petitions and 6,627 in forma pauperis petitions were filed 
during the October 2007 Term, that it heard argument in seventy-five separate docket-
numbered cases, and issued sixty-seven written opinions). 
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technology, and a bevy of talented clerks,9 the current Supreme Court 
decides only a trickle of cases. 
In this Article, we argue that Congress should expand the 
Court’s decisionmaking capacity by implementing three features of 
U.S. court of appeals decisionmaking. First, we argue that the Court 
should increase its membership so that it is comparable in size to the 
U.S. courts of appeals, seconding an argument made by others 
including Professor Jonathan Turley.10 These courts have around 
thirteen authorized judgeships per circuit (ranging from six 
authorized judgeships on the First Circuit to twenty-nine on the Ninth 
Circuit).11 Second, as we have argued in a recently published article,12 
the Court should hear most of its cases in panels rather than as a full 
Court, which could at least double and perhaps even triple the 
Supreme Court’s decisionmaking capacity,13 while having only a 
negligible impact on Court outcomes.14 Third, the Court should retain 
the authority to grant en banc review in the small fraction of cases 
that call for the Court to speak as a full body. 
By embracing these changes—that is, by increasing the number 
of Justices on the Supreme Court and by adopting the practice of 
panel decisionmaking with an en banc procedure available for 
selected cases—the Supreme Court could expand its decisionmaking 
capacity dramatically. Expanded decisionmaking capacity, if 
exercised, offers several benefits, including greater clarity and 
consistency in the law. And a Court with greater capacity, whether 
 
 9. See KERMIT HALL, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 185 (2d ed. 2005). 
 10. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the Court: The Case for the Expansion of the 
United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century, 33 PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 155, 155–56 
(2004); see also Oliver, supra note 4, at 408 (identifying Court expansion as an option if it is 
impossible to impose term limits on Justices). 
 11. This figure is the median number of judges, a more representative statistic than the 
mean in this instance. The mean is skewed by the Ninth Circuit which has twenty-nine judges, 
twelve more than the next largest circuit. To underscore its unique size among the thirteen 
circuits, the Ninth continues to grow while the others have not: Congress transferred one 
judgeship in 2008 from the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth Circuit. Court Security Improvement Act 
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 509, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543 (2008) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44 note 
(2006)) (transferring a 2008 vacancy on the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth Circuit where it would be 
available on January 21, 2009). None of the other circuits has added a judge since 1990. Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990 § 202, 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
 12. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-imagining Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825 (2008). 
 13. Id. at 1830–31. 
 14. Id. at 1837–47. 
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exercised or not, also would act as a more reliable check and balance 
on the other branches. But even if the Court opted not to exercise its 
expanded capacity and continued to hear only a handful of cases each 
year, our proposal would offer several other benefits, including a 
more credible threat of review, a more dynamic Court, and a more 
representative and diverse membership. 
To develop our argument, this Article proceeds as follows. In 
Part I, we make our case for capacity. We identify three reasons—
clarity, consistency, and checks and balances—why the Court should 
have, and should use, additional decisionmaking capacity. Having 
made the case for capacity in Part I, we propose in Part II that 
Congress expand the Court’s capacity by adopting a three-pronged 
approach to decisionmaking: expand the Court’s size, adopt panel 
decisionmaking, and retain limited en banc review. In Part III, we 
argue that remaking the Court in this fashion will produce other 
benefits, which, coupled with the prospective capacity gains, trump 
the concerns this proposal might raise. We conclude with some 
general observations about Supreme Court decisionmaking. 
Our broader goal in this Article, as in our other work on 
Supreme Court decisionmaking, is to question the Court’s 
“institutional design”—the rules, norms, and other practices that 
determine how an organization operates.15 Questioning the Court’s 
institutional design might seem heretical to some Court watchers, but 
it shouldn’t. In contrast to Articles I16 and II17 of the Constitution, 
which describe in some detail how the legislative and executive 
branches are to function, Article III says almost nothing about the 
institutional design of the Supreme Court.18 This constitutional silence 
 
 15. Political scientists may use the term “institution” to refer to institutional design as we 
describe it here. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS: 
THEORETICAL LENSES ON PUBLIC POLICY 35, 36–37 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be 
composed of members chosen every second year” and setting forth the qualifications for a 
Representative); id. art. I, § 3 (providing that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each state . . . for six years; and each Senator shall have one 
vote” and setting forth the qualifications for a Senator); id. art. I, § 5 (setting “a majority of each 
[House]” as “a quorum to do business” and allowing that “a smaller number may adjourn from 
day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members”). 
 17. Id. art. II, § 1 (detailing the method of election of and the qualifications for the 
President). 
 18. See id. art. III, §§ 1–3 (assigning the judicial power to a “Supreme Court” but making 
no provision as to the qualifications or number of judges for this Court and offering no guidance 
as to the Court’s internal organization or procedures). 
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gives Congress and the Court license to alter the Court’s practices and 
procedures, and historically, they have taken full advantage. In its 
early years, the Court’s jurisdiction,19 courtroom practices,20 size,21 and 
composition22 changed significantly and with some frequency. In 
recent years, however, the Court’s structure and practices have 
remained largely static, with very few meaningful changes in the 
Court’s design. In rather stark contrast to the historical Supreme 
Court, the modern Supreme Court has come to seem fixed or 
untouchable, more like a museum without an acquisition budget than 
the complex political institution it is. 
This stasis has not gone unnoticed. With increasing frequency 
since the end of the Rehnquist Court, commentators are 
recommending changes to the Court’s institutional design, motivated 
in no small measure by the Court’s stagnation.23 Among other 
 
 19. For a description of the Court’s changing jurisdiction, see RICHARD H. FALLON, 
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 29–43, 268–73, 1552–56 (5th ed. 2003). 
 20. For a discussion of one such change—that is, the evolution of oral argument practice—
in the Court, see generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 848–60 
(4th ed. 2004). 
 21. The Court’s membership has ranged from six to ten Justices. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 
ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (six Justices); Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421 (seven); 
Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176 (nine); Act of Mar. 8, 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 
794, 794 (ten); Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (seven); Act of July 23, 1869, 
ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44 (nine). As part of the major reorganization of the federal courts in 
1801, Congress decreased the Court’s size to five Justices (four Associate Justices and the Chief 
Justice). Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89. Because the Court had six Justices 
protected by life tenure at the time of the legislation, the smaller Court size would not take 
effect until the next Court vacancy; however, the Act was repealed in 1802 before a vacancy had 
occurred. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. 
 22. The qualifications and characteristics of the Justices have changed markedly over time, 
both demographically (for example, age, race, religion, gender) and professionally (for example, 
educational experience, judicial experience, political experience). Whereas Justices were once 
all white, Protestant men, the twenty-first-century Court includes Justices who are African 
American, female, Catholic, and Jewish. For the backgrounds of the Justices, see LEE EPSTEIN 
ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 263 (4th 
ed. 2006). At one time, a law degree—any degree—was not a prerequisite for appointment to 
the Court. But every Justice since 1941 (when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed 
Robert Jackson who had none) has had both undergraduate and law degrees. See id. at 291–302 
tbl.4-4. Circuit court experience has become a de facto prerequisite. See Tracey E. George, 
From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 
1336–40 (2008) (describing the change in the norm of prior federal judicial experience for 
Supreme Court Justices). 
 23. See REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 4 passim. 
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proposals, commentators have advocated mandatory retirement,24 
term limits,25 “circuit riding,”26 cameras in the courtroom,27 alterations 
in judicial selection procedures,28 and so on. We applaud these 
commentators for questioning the Court’s institutional design, and in 
this Article, we attempt to make our own modest contribution to this 
endeavor by advancing our three-pronged approach to Supreme 
Court decisionmaking. 
The proposal we advance in this Article might seem far-fetched 
because it challenges a widely held conception of the Supreme 
Court—nine Justices, sitting together, rendering decisions as a full 
body. In fact, however, our proposal is quite modest. In contrast to 
several of the other proposals that have been advanced, ours would 
not require a constitutional amendment.29 Moreover, our proposal, 
again in contrast to several of the others, is consistent both with the 
Court’s own history and with the practices of courts of last resort in 
other jurisdictions.30 Thus, as preposterous as it might sound at first 
blush, the decisionmaking proposal we advance in this Article is not 
so far-fetched after all. 
I.  THE CASE FOR CAPACITY 
The most striking feature of contemporary Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is how little of it there is. Originally, the Court, like 
many other appellate courts, had a mandatory docket.31 In response to 
the Court’s staggering caseload following the Civil War, Congress 
 
 24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Mandatory Retirement for Supreme Court Justices, in 
REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 4, at 415, 427–33. 
 25. See id. at 419. 
 26. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A 
Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388–89 (2006); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court 
Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1712 (2007). 
 27. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Let the Sun Shine on the Supreme Court, 35 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 161, 168 (2008). 
 28. See, e.g., Terri L. Peretti, Promoting Equity in the Distribution of Supreme Court 
Appointments, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 4, at 435, 436 (advocating a guaranteed 
Supreme Court appointment in each presidential term). 
 29. Term limits, for example, would be contrary to Article III’s provision of life tenure for 
judges selected for the Supreme Court and inferior courts created pursuant to Article III. See 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
 30. The most obvious examples of such proposals are term limits and mandatory 
retirement ages (separate, but related proposals). Both directly conflict with Article III’s 
promise of life tenure and thus would require a constitutional amendment. See id. 
 31. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1552–56. 
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granted the Court discretion over a portion of its docket in 1891.32 
That discretion was substantially expanded in 1925 to a level 
comparable to that which the Justices enjoy today.33 For the next 
twenty-five years, the Court heard a significant number (and 
percentage) of the cases it was asked to hear: the Court typically 
heard 112 to 164 cases each year.34 The Justices were granting 15 to 20 
percent of paid petitions during this time (and a much smaller 
percentage of unpaid petitions), and the percentage of paid cases 
granted review did not drop below 10 percent until 1968. The Justices 
continued to hear more than one hundred cases annually until 1992, 
at which point the Court’s decisionmaking output began to dwindle. 
In the seventies, the Court granted review to more than two hundred 
cases per term. But after 1992, the Justices granted full plenary review 
to fewer than one hundred cases, averaging ninety cases annually 
since that time. From a peak of 299 cases in 1971, the Court heard just 
over one-quarter as many cases twenty-five years later.35 
Figure 1.  All Cases Reviewed 
 
 
 32. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006)). 
 33. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1257 (2006)). 
 34. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 72–73 tbl.2-5. The range is one standard deviation 
above and below the average for the period. 
 35. Id. at 74–75 tbl.2-6. The caseload numbers are based on the figures reported by the 
Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts. For 1926–2004, see id. at 72–73 tbl.2-5, 74–75 tbl.2-6. 
For October Terms 2002–06, see JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR 84 tbl.A-1 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusines 
pdfversion.pdf. 
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 By hearing so few cases, the Court has neglected the many 
obligations it faces as a coequal branch of government and the 
pinnacle of the judiciary. To enable the Court to better fulfill those 
obligations, Congress should provide the Court with more 
opportunities to conduct review. Expanded decisionmaking capacity 
would offer several benefits, which we group loosely into three 
categories: clarity, consistency, and checks and balances. 
A. Clarity 
Expanded decisionmaking capacity, if exercised by the Court, 
would promote greater clarity in the law, as Chief Justice Roberts 
observed during his Senate confirmation hearings.36 The Court could 
provide greater clarity in the law in at least two critical ways. 
First, if the Court decided more cases, it would correct more 
errors committed by lower courts. Like all appellate courts, the 
Supreme Court bears at least some responsibility for monitoring 
lower court decisions and remedying errors that litigants bring to the 
Court’s attention.37 Although the Court cannot correct every error, it 
should strive, at a minimum, to correct those that are so substantial as 
to “depart[] from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings.”38 With expanded decisionmaking capacity, the Court 
would be able to hear many more cases and remedy many more legal 
errors, thereby ensuring greater clarity in the law. 
 
 36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 37. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 120 (1927). 
 38. SUP. CT. R. 10(a). We of course are not asserting that the Supreme Court’s primary 
function is as a court of error correction. A single institution, even with panels, could not correct 
error in the more than thirty thousand cases decided on the merits by the federal courts of 
appeals and the many more issued by state high courts. See DUFF, supra note 35, at 113 tbl.B-5 
(reporting that the U.S. courts of appeals terminated 31,717 cases on the merits for the one-year 
period ending September 2007); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECTS: STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 47–50 tbl.17 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006_files/StateCourtCaseloadTables-Appellate 
Courts.pdf (reporting the total number of dispositions by signed opinion by state for state courts 
of last resort and, where applicable, state intermediate appellate courts). Instead we are 
pointing out that the Court does have a responsibility to correct error that undermines the 
clarity, predictability, and uniformity of national law (as Rule 10 acknowledges). But see 
Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 
8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not a court of error 
correction per se). 
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Second, the Court provides greater clarity in the law not only by 
deciding cases but also by providing reasons for those decisions. The 
Court, in other words, is not merely a dispute resolution body—it is 
also a “reason-giving” body. Through its decisions, the Court explains 
the law and thereby offers guidance for how future cases should be 
treated.39 If the Court decided more cases, it would issue more 
majority opinions and speak to a wider array of subjects, providing 
more clarity about the rules that govern citizen behavior. 
B. Consistency 
With greater capacity, the Court could also produce a more 
uniform or consistent federal law, as Chief Justice Roberts also noted 
at his Senate confirmation hearing.40 The Supreme Court, as the 
supreme judicial body, is responsible for addressing “circuit splits,” 
which arise when two or more courts of appeals interpret the same 
law differently.41 As lower federal court dockets have expanded,42 
circuit splits have increased.43 Over the last twenty years, the Supreme 
 
 39. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (arguing that 
in a common-law system, the reasons given for a court’s decision for or against a particular party 
matter more than the decision itself). 
 40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
responsibility to maintain uniformity in federal law, see, for example, Breyer, supra note 38, at 
92; Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1400, 1405–07 (1987). 
 41. Supreme Court Rule 10 includes as a “compelling reason” to grant a petition that “a 
United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another 
United States court of appeals on the same important matter” or “that conflicts with a decision 
by a state court of last resort.” SUP. CT. R. 10(a). The Supreme Court appears sensitive to Rule 
10’s position as reflected in the fact that the Court is far more likely to grant a petition if the 
case involves a direct conflict between circuits. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, 
Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUPREME CT. 
ECON. REV. 171, 195 tbl.4 (2001) (reporting the results from a multivariate analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari). For the purposes of that study, Professors George 
and Solimine defined a circuit split as a case in which any judge on panel which decided the case 
below “explicitly stated [in a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion] that another circuit or 
circuits had reached a different decision in analogous circumstances” and moreover the judge 
described the conflict as direct rather than a matter of mere inconsistency. See id. at 188. 
 42. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal 
Theory and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2008) 
(detailing the growth in the lower court docket). 
 43. See George & Solimine, supra note 41, at 192, 193 tbl.2 (reporting, based on a random 
sample of en banc and panel decisions in circuit courts, that 14 out of 71 en banc cases and 34 
out of 213 panel cases involved a direct circuit conflict); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, 
The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of 
Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 142 (2006) (estimating, as part of a study of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of cases involving splits, that at least 16 percent of circuit cases from 
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Court has cited a circuit conflict as the reason for granting review in 
more than one-third of its cases.44 Despite the attention given to 
circuit splits, however, the Roberts Court is unable to address even 
half of those identified by litigants because the Court hears so few 
cases.45 
Circuit splits create uncertainties in the law, lead to outcomes in 
which similarly situated litigants are treated differently, encourage 
forum shopping, and cause other problems.46 Indeed, courts, 
Congress, and commentators have long worried about circuit splits 
and have attempted to devise various ways of addressing them, 
including creating a new court solely for that purpose.47 Congress 
 
1985–95 included a split); see also Split Circuits, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2009) (“tracking developments concerning splits among the federal circuit courts” and 
demonstrating, in a uniquely modern way, the size of the problem). 
 44. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL 
DATABASE, 1953–2005 TERMS (2006). The database begins with the first term of the Warren 
Court and is continuously updated with a lag to allow for collecting data. See generally Harold J. 
Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, The U.S. Supreme Court Data Base: Providing New Insights into the 
Court, 83 JUDICATURE 228 passim (2000) (offering a highly accessible explanation of and guide 
to the database as part of an issue devoted to publicly available data on the courts). The 
University of South Carolina Judicial Research Initiative maintains a website from which 
researchers may download datasets of court cases including the Spaeth Database. Judicial 
Research Initiative, U.S. Supreme Court Databases, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 45. See George & Solimine, supra note 41, at 193 tbl.2 (finding that the Court granted 
certiorari to less than half of the petitions in their study that demonstrated a direct conflict 
between circuits, and further finding that this included en banc cases which presumably involve 
issues of greater importance). 
 46. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976) (explaining that 
“appellate courts are needed to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of decision employed 
by the legal system in which they serve”); Baker & McFarland, supra note 40, at 1407 
(explaining how “discrepancies created by [lack of Supreme Court action] attract strategic and 
inefficient litigation”); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and 
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) 
(explaining why “a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law is necessary to the 
successful operation of the legal system”). 
 47. See Intercircuit Panel of the United States Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 130 (1985) (noting that Chief Justice 
Burger first suggested the creation of an Intercircuit Panel); COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE 
FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 3–4, 8 (1975) (noting that 
Congress was considering restricting access to the federal courts to alleviate stress on the 
judicial system and proposing in the alternative the creation of a new National Court of Appeals 
to resolve intercircuit conflicts, subject to the review of the Supreme Court). For comparative 
evaluations of various proposals, see, for example, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND 
OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 75–83 (1993); 
Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A 
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granted the Court discretion over the majority of its jurisdiction in 
order to allow the Court to focus on maintaining uniformity of law.48 
If the Supreme Court were able to hear more cases, it could perform 
this function better, providing greater consistency across the circuits. 
Uncertainty is not limited to direct conflicts in circuit decisions, 
but can involve any ongoing litigation in which there is a significant 
ground for difference of opinion on a substantial question and where 
the circuit’s incorrect resolution may be costly. The Supreme Court 
Rules already envision a procedure by which a circuit may seek the 
Court’s input prior to the circuit’s resolution of a question. Rule 19 
allows a court of appeals to “certify to [the Supreme] Court a 
question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the 
proper decision of a case.”49 Congress authorized appellate 
jurisdiction over questions certified by courts of appeals when it 
created these intermediate appellate courts in 189150 and continued to 
do so through a century of revisions to the Court’s jurisdiction.51 
Although certification gives Justices the authority to respond to 
“live” questions from circuit judges, the Justices no longer use that 
power with any regularity, discouraging circuit certification as they do 
certiorari petitions by refusing to hear them.52 This is unfortunate as 
certification today could be even more valuable than it was a hundred 
 
Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395, 396 (2000) (analyzing a “long line of studies, 
committees, commissions” which have addressed the problems facing the federal courts and 
suggesting various solutions). 
 48. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1685, 1698 (2000) (recounting the testimony of 
Justices Taft and Van Devanter to Congress on how the expansion of the Court’s discretion 
over its jurisdiction would increase uniformity of the law). 
 49. SUP. CT. R. 19(1). 
 50. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, Ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (providing that the newly 
minted circuit courts of appeals “in every such subject within its appellate jurisdiction the circuit 
court of appeals at any time may certify to the Supreme Court of the United States any 
questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires the instruction of that court for its 
proper decision”); see also Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, ch. 81, § 1254, 62 Stat. 869, 928 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006)) (delineating that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court” by either of two methods—the first being a writ of certiorari 
from a party and the second being “[b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any 
question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired”). 
 51. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION § 1438 (3d ed. 2008) (“It is noteworthy that Congress chose to retain the 
certification jurisdiction even as it was abolishing virtually all of the appeal jurisdiction.”). 
 52. Technically, the Court refuses to entertain these requests for review in different ways: it 
dismisses certified questions and refuses to grant certiorari petitions. For a discussion of the 
history of circuit certification, see Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1650–57; Frederick Bernays 
Wiener, The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 66 (1954). 
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years ago when the Supreme Court was more receptive to such 
requests.53 As with interlocutory appeals in the courts of appeals, 
certification allows the Court to address a specific and substantial 
question that is the subject of meaningful uncertainty, and the Court 
thereby increases the probability of a correct outcome below.54 
Likewise, the Court may allow for more timely and cost-effective 
resolution of substantial cases by intervening to answer a limited 
question prior to the circuit’s complete determination of all issues 
posed by an appeal (and before the possible remand to the trial 
court). Certification also offers a powerful and credible signal of a 
new and important question that merits Court resolution. Indeed, 
Professor Hartnett has argued that the Court has ignored 
congressional intent to grant circuit courts of appeals some influence 
over the Court’s docket.55 Expanded capacity could support revisiting 
the certification mechanism. 
C. Checks and Balances 
If the Court possessed more decisionmaking capacity, it could 
also play a more active separation of powers role. Under our 
constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court (along with the rest of the 
federal judiciary) comprises a third and ostensibly coequal branch of 
government, charged with providing a check on the other two 
branches.56 Of the three branches, the judiciary is arguably the 
weakest because it lacks both resources (in contrast to the legislative 
branch) and enforcement power (in contrast to the executive 
branch).57 Relative to the other branches, the Supreme Court also 
produces little law. During George W. Bush’s presidency, Congress 
 
 53. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 51, §§ 1675–76 (reporting that eighty-five certified 
cases were docketed between 1927 and 1936, but only twenty from 1937 to 1946. Only three 
certified cases have been docketed in recent years.); Wiener, supra note 52, at 66 (“The 
certificate, once a fruitful source of cases heard by the Court, has dwindled in importance over 
the years, and recently there has been, on an average, only one certificate per Term.”). 
 54. See James William Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification 
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 26, 46–49 (1949) (including a detailed 
accounting of every case involving certification). 
 55. See Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1710–12; see also Moore & Vestal, supra note 54, at 21 
(describing certification as “the tool given to the courts of appeals”). 
 56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”). 
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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passed nearly two thousand public laws.58 Bush himself contributed 
more than one-half-million pages to the Federal Register,59 submitted 
almost 100 treaties to the Senate,60 and issued close to 300 executive 
orders.61 During roughly the same period, the Supreme Court decided 
fewer than six hundred cases.62 If the Court’s decisionmaking 
capacities expanded, it could play a much more prominent role in 
policing the actions of the other branches. 
Closely related to its role as a coequal branch of the federal 
government, the Supreme Court also provides a check on state 
courts.63 Indeed, the Supreme Court is the only federal court 
empowered to review state court interpretations of federal law, 
including the U.S. Constitution. When it does so, the Court plays an 
important federalism role because it ensures that state high courts 
protect the liberties of citizens.64 With greater decisionmaking 
capacity, the Court is more likely to review state actions that run 
afoul of federal interpretations of federal law. 
D. Summary 
 Because it would enable the Supreme Court to play a more 
active role as a check on the other branches and as the head of the 
judicial hierarchy, the Court should have, and should use, more 
decisionmaking capacity. We recognize that some might find the idea 
of expanded Supreme Court decisionmaking troublesome. Some 
 
 58. See Library of Cong.: Thomas, View Public Laws for the 109th Congress,, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d109/d109laws.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (noting that public laws 
“make up most of the laws passed by Congress”); Library of Cong.: Thomas, Search Multiple 
Congresses, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2009) (providing access to the public laws passed by the 107th through 110th Congress). 
 59. See GPO Access, Federal Register: Simple Search, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/ 
search.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). This site is a searchable database of the Federal Register 
that includes an index from which we calculated the total number of pages published annually 
from 2001 through 2008. 
 60. See Library of Cong.: Thomas, Treaties, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties. 
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (containing treaties that were submitted to the Senate during the 
107th through 110th Congress). 
 61. Nat’l Archives, The Federal Register: Administration of George W. Bush (2001–2009), 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/wbush.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 62. See DUFF, supra note 35, at 84 tbl.A-1; supra Figure 1: All Cases Reviewed. 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court the power to review state high 
court decisions on federal law). 
 64. From 1953 through 2006, the Supreme Court decided 1,388 cases appealed from state 
and territorial courts and reversed more than 70 percent of those lower courts’ rulings. See 
SPAETH, supra note 44 (providing the raw data from which we draw these figures). 
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might argue, for example, that the Supreme Court should not play a 
more active role interpreting or making law because its members are 
unelected.65 Likewise, others might object to a more active Supreme 
Court on ideological grounds, if the Supreme Court’s apparent 
political ideology is significantly more liberal or conservative than 
theirs.66 
This concern, though certainly legitimate, is overblown for 
several reasons. First, as noted in Part II.B,67 the Supreme Court 
reaches unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in roughly half of its 
cases, even given sharp ideological divisions on the Court. This 
suggests that ideological concerns, though nontrivial, are 
consequential in a smaller fraction of the Court’s docket than the 
public might imagine. Second, even if the Court heard two, three, or 
even ten times as many cases as it hears today, its output would still 
pale in comparison to the law propounded by the other two branches 
(not to mention all of the lower courts). Third, the Court only takes 
cases and controversies that are brought to it. Even if it were to 
address many more matters than it does now, it would still only touch 
on a limited range of legal issues. Fourth, and finally, the Court does 
not have money or might, so the other branches provide a kind of 
ultimate check against any potential abuse of power. 
II.  PROPOSAL TO EXPAND COURT CAPACITY 
 To expand the Court’s decisionmaking capacity, as advocated in 
Part I, Congress could adopt any number of reforms, including 
altering the Court’s jurisdiction or imposing workload requirements. 
 
 65. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. 1986) (coining the phrase “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,” which has come to mean the dilemma posed by unelected judges overturning elected 
policymakers in a democratic regime); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174–76 (1999) (arguing that the Constitution should 
be taken away from judges and returned to the people to allow for a “populist constitutional 
law”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Congressional Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J.L. & POL. 577, 
588–90 (2004) (advocating for a contraction of Court jurisdiction in order to prevent judicial 
subrogation of the legislative function); Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the 
Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178, 182 (1997) (arguing that Congress should regulate and/or 
restrict Court jurisdiction to curb judicial policymaking). 
 66. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: 
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1453–55 (2001) (concluding that attacks on the 
legal legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review are tied closely to the social 
legitimacy of its decisions). 
 67. See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
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We recommend, instead, that Congress expand the Court’s capacity 
by enacting the following measures: First, Congress should expand 
the size of the Court. Second, Congress should establish panel 
decisionmaking as the default mode of decisionmaking on the Court. 
Third, because some cases are arguably so significant as to call for the 
full Court to speak, Congress should adopt an en banc procedure for 
selected cases. In short, we argue that Congress should remake the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. courts’ of appeals image. 
A. Expand the Court 
We first recommend that Congress enact a statute authorizing 
the Court to expand the size of its membership. More Justices—
particularly if they sit in panels, as we advocate in Section B—means 
many more decisionmaking opportunities for the Supreme Court. 
To some, it might seem sacrilegious to suggest that Congress 
should alter the size of the Court’s membership. In fact, however, 
there is nothing sacrosanct about nine Justices sitting on the Supreme 
Court. Other high courts have widely varying memberships. For 
example, the International Court of Justice has fifteen members68 and 
the Indian Supreme Court can have twenty-six judges.69 More 
tellingly, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has seen its membership 
change with some regularity. The Court’s membership ranged from 
six Justices in 1789 to ten in 1863.70 Moreover, for nearly four decades, 
the Court directed one lone Justice to decide all of the Court’s cases 
during the summer, effectively creating a part-time, one-Justice 
Supreme Court.71 And between 1866 and 1891, various members of 
Congress called for a dramatic expansion of the Supreme Court from 
nine to fifteen, eighteen, or even twenty-four Justices to respond to 
crippling caseloads.72 Although these proposals were unsuccessful, 
 
 68. Sonya Brown, International Court of Justice, in 2 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A 
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 720, 722 (Herbert Kritzer ed., 2002). 
 69. Jayanth K. Krishnan, India, in 2 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, supra note 68, at 696 
(“The Supreme Court of India is made up of the chief justice and no more than twenty-five 
other judges appointed by the president.”). 
 70. See supra note 21. 
 71. See Ross E. Davies, The Other Supreme Court, 31 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 221, 221 
(2006). 
 72. See, e.g., 10 CONG. REC. 528 (1880) (reflecting Representative Manning’s introduction 
of H.R. No. 3843, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1880), to expand the Court and allow for divisional 
sittings); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 214 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (noting 
Edmunds’ proposal that the number of Justices be doubled, as an alternative to adding circuit 
judgeships); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1484 (1869) (statement of the Chief Clerk) 
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this history suggests that the idea of a dramatically expanded 
Supreme Court had at least some traction in Congress. And President 
Franklin Roosevelt clearly believed that a larger Court was feasible, 
even if the context and means of his plan doomed it.73 
 Despite the variance in the size of the Court’s membership in its 
earlier years, the Court has been frozen at nine Justices since 1869. 
But since then, the Court has often decided cases with fewer than 
nine Justices due to vacancies, illnesses, and recusals.74 Since 1954, in 
fact, the Court has decided nearly one-quarter of its merits decisions 
(1,369 cases) without a full complement of Justices.75 
 This history shows that there is nothing inevitable about a nine-
Justice high Court and that the administration of justice proceeds 
apace regardless of the number of sitting Justices. This means that the 
size of the Court—in contrast to the size of the Senate or the House 
of Representatives76—is truly up for grabs. 
1. Size.  Given that the size of the Court is up for grabs, what 
number of Justices should sit on the Court? What adjustments, if any, 
should Congress make to the size of the Court’s membership? 
 One possibility is to reduce the number of Justices. Not long 
ago, the Court routinely heard about twice as many cases as it hears 
today,77 so perhaps Congress should reduce the Court’s membership 
by a similar amount. If five Justices worked at the same pace as their 
brethren in the 1970s and 1980s, they could decide, at least in theory, 
 
(recording Drake’s motion to amend a judiciary bill by increasing the number of Associate 
Justices from eight to fourteen); see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial 
Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Constitutional Regulation of the Courts, 
78 IND. L.J. 153, 186 (2003) (discussing proposals to divide the size of the Court). 
 73. Following his landslide reelection in 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a 
plan to allow him to appoint six additional Justices—one for each Justice over the age of 
seventy—to the Court. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: 
FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1141 (1987) (noting that President 
Roosevelt veiled his proposal to add six Justices to the Court with a “smokescreen” argument to 
improve the efficiency of the judicial system). 
 74. By statute, six Justices constitute a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also SUP. CT. R. 
4(2) (“Six Members of the Court constitute a quorum.”). 
 75. These calculations are based on an analysis of decisions in the Spaeth Supreme Court 
Database. (Focusing only on observations in which ANALU=1 and DEC_TYPE=1, 6, or 7, we 
computed the number of observations in which the vote totaled less than nine.) See Harold J. 
Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, http://www.cas.sc.edu/ 
poli/juri/sctdata.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (establishing the size of the House of Representatives); id. 
art. I, § 3 (establishing the size of the Senate). 
 77. See supra Part I. 
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the same number of cases as the current nine-member Court decides. 
Our goal, however, is not to improve the Court’s work ethic; rather, 
our goal is to expand the Court’s capacity to decide cases. Shrinking 
the Court won’t do that. 
 Another possibility, surely the most likely, is to leave the Court 
as it is. The Court has had nine members—even if fewer than nine 
have participated in a large fraction of the Court’s decisionmaking78—
for nearly a century and a half. On the basis of an “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it” rationale, some might lobby for the status quo. If nine 
Justices were to work as diligently as their predecessors appear to 
have worked, they could easily hear twice as many cases, thereby 
enabling the Court to better fulfill its obligation as a coequal branch 
and the top dog of the judiciary. Although we have seen some signs 
under Chief Justice Roberts that the Court might resolve more merits 
cases, we doubt that the Court, as presently constituted, will return to 
its 1970s and 1980s form. Moreover, we believe the Court should 
decide even more cases—or at least have greater opportunity to 
decide more cases—so we reject the status quo. 
 The third possibility, which is the one we embrace, is to expand 
the size of the Court. But how many Justices should there be? We do 
not know how to calculate an “optimal” number of Supreme Court 
Justices, but we can turn to several external criteria to shed light on 
this question. 
 First, we could look at the number of circuits. Until recently, the 
number of Justices was based on this number. As the federal judicial 
system currently has thirteen circuits, the Court would have thirteen 
Justices. The original rationale for tying the Court’s size to the 
number of circuits was that the Justices were assigned to sit on the 
circuit courts. While Justices no longer ride circuit, they do continue 
to review circuit decisions. And, the number of circuit decisions is 
correlated roughly with the number of circuits. 
 Second, we could measure the size of the federal judiciary more 
directly rather than using the number of circuits as a proxy. We could 
look to the number of cases resolved on the merits or to the number 
of judges issuing rulings. Both make sense—the Justices can be 
perceived as reviewing cases or monitoring judges. In 1929, Congress 
added a tenth circuit without adding a tenth Justice.79 And in that 
 
 78. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
 79. The D.C. Circuit was still the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1929. 
Five years later, Congress reorganized the court as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
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year, the circuits resolved approximately two thousand cases on the 
merits.80 During the last term, that number had risen to more than 
thirty thousand.81 If the Court’s size expanded with lower court 
caseload, the number of justices would have to increase by a factor of 
fifteen to 135, an unworkable number. Moreover, it seems unlikely 
that each case justifies such weight. We could instead look at the 
expansion of the circuit bench during that time. The courts of appeals 
had forty-five active judgeships in 1930,82 and have 179 today.83 This 
four-fold increase is more tenable, but it would produce a Supreme 
Court larger than the largest court of appeals (the Ninth at twenty-
nine). 
 Third, the size of the individual courts of appeals is relevant. 
Congress has evaluated, through hearings and special commissions, 
the proper size for an appeals court. Today, the average circuit has 
fourteen active judges (plus several senior judges).84 Perhaps more 
tellingly, Congress allows circuits with more than fifteen judges to 
hold “mini” en banc sessions in which eleven judges, rather than all of 
the circuit’s judges, sit on behalf of the full court.85  
 Ultimately, we conclude that Congress should authorize fifteen 
Supreme Court Justices, retaining the odd number that is useful in 
collective sittings and allowing for five panels of three. Congress, 
based on the feedback of numerous commissions and other studies, 
concluded that fifteen was the tipping point at which mini–en banc 
should be made an option. We conclude that this is a reasonable 
number to treat as the maximum workable and it still allows for an 
 
and the “justices” of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia became circuit judges. 
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926, 926. 
 80. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR 1929, at 8 (1929). 
 81. See DUFF, supra note 35, at 113–16 tbl.B-5. 
 82. See Act of June 10, 1930, 46 Stat. 538; see also Fed. Judicial Ctr., The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/autoframe?openform& 
top=/history/home.nsf/page/courtssitecontent&nav=/history/home.nsf/page/ca_nav&page=/histo
ry/home.nsf/page/ca_bdy (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (follow the hyperlink for each circuit to 
determine the number of active judgeships in 1930). 
 83. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals: Additional Authorized 
Judgeships, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/appealsauth.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2008). 
 84. Id. (reporting the number of judges per circuit and noting that the mean is 14 and the 
median is 12.5). 
 85. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (allowing circuit courts to sit en banc and providing that 
the en banc court must consist of all active judges unless the circuit exceeds fifteen judges (as set 
in a separate statute)). The Ninth Circuit has fully implemented this system. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
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easy division into panels of three. We know of no scientific basis for 
fifteen—or for nine.86 
2. Implementation.  If Congress were to expand the Court from 
nine Justices to fifteen Justices, as we advocate in Section A.1, it 
would also have to give some thought to how to implement this 
change. Authorizing the sitting president at the time to expand the 
Court by two-thirds would create a political uproar, as President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt discovered.87 Moreover, it would not further 
our secondary goal of smoothing the timing and political composition 
of Supreme Court appointments.88 The statutes would create new 
seats on a rolling basis: if no Justice retired during a congressional 
term, then a new seat would be added. Every president, then, would 
be allowed to appoint at least one Justice during each Congress—
either into a new seat or a vacated one—until there were fourteen 
Associate Justices and one Chief Justice.89 If no Justices retire, then a 
new seat would be created and the president would fill it. If one or 
more Justices retire, then no seats would be created but the president 
would fill the vacated seats. This slower addition of Justices would 
also allow the Court time to adjust its other rules, norms, and 
practices to its increasing size; new Justices to gain expertise and 
knowledge of the Court’s workings; and the (interested) public to 
become accustomed to a larger bench. Finally, it would make the 
proposal more politically feasible. 
B. Embrace Panel Decisionmaking 
 Adding more Justices by itself might or might not enhance 
Supreme Court decisionmaking capacity. But when coupled with our 
second proposed reform—panel decisionmaking90—the potential 
 
 86. Professor Turley suggests a Court of nineteen, but he does not offer any reason for that 
specific number. See Turley, supra note 10, at 158–59. 
 87. See Caldeira, supra note 73, at 1140–42. 
 88. As Professor Bradley Joondeph has argued, the system for appointing justices is flawed 
in that it “allocate[s] opportunities to influence the policy direction of the Court serendipitously, 
and this irregularity undermines the Court’s legitimacy.” See Bradley W. Joondeph, Law, 
Politics, and the Appointments Process, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 737, 763 (2006) (book 
review). 
 89. Our proposal is similar to one made by Professor Terri Peretti, who has proposed 
granting every president at least one but no more than two appointments per presidential term. 
See Peretti, supra note 28, at 435, 449. 
 90. When state legislatures consider adopting a divisional or panel system, they generally 
do so in order to expand the docket of the court of last resort. For example, a 1927 advisory 
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capacity gains are enormous. If the current, nine-member Supreme 
Court sat in three-Justice panels rather than en banc, the Court’s 
output could, at least in theory, triple.91 If a fifteen-member Supreme 
Court sat in three-Justice panels, the Court’s output could, at least in 
theory, increase by a factor of five. This means that the Court could 
decide roughly four hundred cases per year rather than seventy-five 
cases per year without working any harder. 
 Of course, the Court is not theoretical but practical, and as a 
practical matter, it is difficult to quantify exactly how large an impact 
expanded membership plus panel decisionmaking might have. Some 
factors—for example, the increased opinion-writing demands 
accompanying a panel system—would decrease the capacity gains 
associated with a move to panels.92 Other factors—for example, the 
efficiencies associated with conferring with two colleagues rather than 
every other member of the Court—could expand the Court’s output.93 
Regardless, it seems safe to assume that a larger Court sitting entirely 
 
commission to the Virginia legislature recommended amending the constitution to allow two 
divisions of the state’s high court, as well as an expansion in its size, to allow the court to hear 
more cases while continuing to produce “opinions that are worth the writing.” REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION TO SUGGEST AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION TO THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H.R. DOC. NO. 2, at ix (1927). Yet, the commission counseled the 
retention of one court “to promote uniformity of decision and keep each of the judges in touch 
with all of the decisions of the appellate court.”Id.; see also Susie M. Sharp, Supreme Courts 
Sitting in Divisions, 10 N.C. L. REV. 351, 363–64 (1932) (providing a detailed explanation of 
states where panel sittings were authorized and noting that in this instance the legislature 
adopted the advisory commission’s recommendations). 
 91. We propose three-Justice panels for two reasons: (1) a three-judge panel constitutes the 
smallest odd-numbered, multi-judge panel possible; and (2) the federal judiciary has had great 
success with three-judge panels on courts of appeals of all sizes and for resolution of special 
issues by three-judge district courts. We do not propose any change in the selection of cases for 
review; thus all Justices would vote on certiorari as they currently do. Presumably, the Court 
would change its Rule of Four to some larger number. Cf. John Paul Stevens, The Lifespan of a 
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (hypothesizing about the source of the 
unwritten norm). 
 92. For a consideration of the relative weight of various case-related responsibilities, see 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 94–95 (1959) (comparing time spent on opinion writing to time spent on 
other tasks). 
 93. For evidence of the collaborative nature of Supreme Court opinion writing, see, for 
example, Pamela C. Corley, Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme 
Court, 90 JUDICATURE 157 (2007). For a discussion of the inefficiencies of en banc panels, see 
DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 230–32 (1988). 
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(or even primarily) in panels could dramatically increase the quantity 
of the Court’s decisions.94 
Panel decisionmaking might seem like a radical idea, but 
Congress actually considered the possibility of Supreme Court panels 
as early as 1869,95 and Representative Van Manning formally offered 
a bill in Congress in 1880 to address the caseload crisis in the Court at 
that time.96 No action was taken on the bill, so Manning offered a new 
bill in 1881 that would have divided the Court into three-Justice 
divisions to handle most of its disputes.97 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee considered Manning’s idea when it sought to restructure 
the federal judiciary, but the committee majority ultimately 
recommended creating intermediate appellate courts rather than 
 
 94. We intentionally say “could” rather than “would” for two reasons. First, the Court’s 
docket is almost entirely plenary, and the Justices therefore would not be required to hear more 
cases than they currently hear. The dynamics of the certiorari process would influence the 
decision. Second, the Court may not be overburdened. Some scholars and Justices have argued 
that the Court is not capacity constrained. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 
151, 174–78 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (claiming that “[w]e are vastly underworked” as 
reflected in “the vast leisure time we presently have”); William O. Douglas, The Supreme Court 
and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 402–04 (1960) (arguing that he could decide more 
cases, and presumably still write books, if the Court granted review to more cases). Of course, 
far greater numbers have made a contrary assertion. See, e.g., WARREN BURGER, YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 8 (1984); Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium of Proposals to 
Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307, 307 n.5 (1983) (presenting 
statements from eight of the sitting Justices that the Court was overworked). As we discuss 
later, panels offer advantages beyond the possibility of resolving larger numbers of cases. That 
said, we believe expanded capacity is the greatest advantage of our proposal. 
 95. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 208–13 (1869) (recording discussion of Senator 
George Henry Williams’s proposal that Congress increase the number of Justices to eighteen 
and then divide the Court into two nine-Justice divisions). While other senators expressed 
support for the idea, at least one supporter doubted that it would be constitutional. Id. at 210 
(statement of Sen. Thurman) (“[A] court divided into sections, if our Constitution permitted it, 
would be the very best system . . . .”). The next record of congressional consideration of panels 
appears in 1876 when Senator Knott suggests “divid[ing] the Supreme Court into divisions of 
three and giv[ing] each division exclusive jurisdiction over a particular class of cases.” 4 CONG. 
REC. 1126 (1876). 
 96. See 10 CONG. REC. 528 (1880) (reflecting Representative Manning’s introduction of 
H.R. 3843, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1880)); see also Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme 
Court of the United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 39 HARV. L. REV. 35, 60 
n.113, 61 n.124 (1925). 
 97. See 13 CONG. REC. 157 (1881) (reflecting Representative Manning’s introduction of 
H.R. 865, 47th Cong. (1st Sess. 1881)); see also Remedy for the Delays Incident to the 
Determination of Suits in the Highest Courts of the United States, 5 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 363, 373 
(1882), reprinted in MAKING OF MODERN LAW, MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS OF A 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF NINE ON THE REMEDY FOR THE DELAYS INCIDENT TO THE 
DETERMINATION OF SUITS IN THE HIGHEST COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (Thomson 
Gale 2004) (1882) [hereinafter Remedy for the Delays] (explaining the facets of Manning’s Bill). 
G&G IN FINAL.DOC  5/5/2009  4:06:04 PM 
2009] REMAKING THE SUPREME COURT 1461 
authorizing Supreme Court panels. But the minority, including the 
committee chair, supported the establishment of panels on the 
Supreme Court for all but the most important cases.98 
In contrast to Congress, which considered but ultimately rejected 
panel decisionmaking, other countries (and some U.S. states) 
embraced divisional sittings. Britain, for example, first adopted panel 
practice for its high court in the Judicature Act of 1875, and the 
House of Lords and Privy Council continue to sit in divisions.99 Other 
common law countries, including Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
and New Zealand, allow their courts of last resort to decide cases in 
panels. And in the United States, nine state high courts use panels to 
decide at least some of their cases.100 In Delaware101 and Mississippi,102 
for example, three-judge panels act for the full court if the panel is 
unanimous. If a panelist dissents or the panel proposes to overrule 
precedent, the high courts in both states rehear the matter en banc. 
 
 98. See 21 CONG. REC. 10,219–32 (1890). A leading proponent of Manning’s Bill was 
William M. Evarts, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, who fought for the division of the 
Supreme Court in front of an American Bar Association committee formed specifically to 
consider the restructuring proposals then under consideration by Congress. See Frankfurter, 
supra note 96, at 77. The ABA committee split along the same lines as the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. See Remedy for the Delays, supra note 97, at 23, 45. The American Law Review, a 
prominent legal quarterly of the time, came out in support of the panel proposal. The Supreme 
Court, 9 AM. L. REV. 668, 675 (1875). In 1921, when Congress again was considering ways to 
alleviate the Court’s workload, the ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform 
recommended increasing the Court’s size to twelve Justices and allowing it to act with as few as 
six Justices. Everett P. Wheeler, Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 44 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 384, 391 (1921), quoted in Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1668. 
 99. ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 165 (1940); United Kingdom, in 4 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
1695, 1698–99 (Herbert Kritzer ed., 2002). 
 100. The state high courts that use a subset of judges to decide at least some cases include 
(with relevant website if available) Alabama, Connecticut (http://www.jud.ct.gov/ystday/org 
court.html), Delaware (http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/?supremerules.pdf) Massachusetts 
(http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/about-the-court.html), Mississippi (http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/ 
rules/msrulesofcourt/rules_of_appellate_procedure.pdf), Montana (http://courts.mt.gov/supreme 
/rules/inter_oper.asp), Nebraska, Nevada (http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/info/about/), and 
Virginia (http://www.courts.state.va.us/scov/cover.htm). Information on Alabama’s and 
Nebraska’s practices was obtained by telephone interview with the courts’ staffs. Telephone 
Interview with Celeste W. Sabel, Senior Staff Att’y, Ala. Supreme Court (2007); Telephone 
Interview with Janice Culver, Deputy Clerk, Neb. Supreme Court (2007). General information 
on state high courts’ structure can be found on the National Center for State Courts interactive 
website. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, http://www.ncsconline.org/ 
D_Research/Ct_Struct/Index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
 101. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 1(e). 
 102. MISS. R. APP. P. 24. 
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 The fact that panel decisionmaking is common on high courts 
and that panels almost found a home on the Supreme Court reveals 
that there is nothing inevitable about en banc decisionmaking on the 
Court. Nonetheless, we suspect that many Court observers find the 
prospect of Supreme Court panels troubling. The idea of a panel 
deciding Roe v. Wade103 or Bush v. Gore,104 as two highly salient 
examples, might be unsettling to some because of the possibility that 
the three Justices assigned to those cases might have reached 
different conclusions than the Court as a whole. If a panel system had 
been in place in 1973 or 2000, would we live in a world without 
abortion rights and with President Gore? For two reasons, the answer 
to these questions is “no.” 
 First, as we explain in greater detail in Section C, below, we 
advocate that the Court retain en banc review for specified cases. 
Under our proposal, both Roe v. Wade and Bush v. Gore would 
qualify (as would similar cases). Thus, truly significant cases—whose 
properties we identify below—would receive en banc review either 
initially or following a panel decision, meaning that landmark cases 
would come out the same way under a panel system as they do under 
the en banc system. 
 Second, and more significantly for the run-of-the-mill case, it 
turns out that randomly assigned panels are likely to produce Court 
outcomes that essentially mirror those the Court would reach as a 
whole. We developed this latter argument in our earlier article 
devoted to panel decisionmaking, so we will dispense with the 
detailed analysis that leads us to this conclusion. We do want to 
provide enough detail, however, to support our argument. 
As a first approximation, a majority of Justices must agree on the 
outcome for the Court to issue an opinion, and if a majority agrees, 
then a majority of panels made up of those Justices would also agree. 
This fact, in and of itself, suggests that there would be a high degree 
of consonance between most panels that might be assigned and the en 
banc Court (assuming, as we do, sincere voting). 
As a second approximation, we examined every merits case the 
Court decided from 1953 to 2007. During this period, the Court 
decided 6,133 cases.105 The Court decided many of these cases by a 
 
 103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 104. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 105. See SPAETH, supra note 44 (presenting the data from which we calculate these 
numbers). 
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wide margin, either unanimously or with one dissenting Justice.106 In 
these cases, every potential three-Justice panel that might have been 
assigned would have reached the same conclusion as the Court as a 
whole. Because nearly 50 percent of the cases were decided without 
dissent or with only one dissenting Justice,107 we know then, based 
solely on these cases, that a minimum of about half of the Court’s 
cases would have come out the same way if the Court had used a 
panel system. (And, it turns out, even 7–2, 6–3, and 5–4 decisions are 
fairly lopsided, resulting in panels reaching the same outcomes as the 
en banc Court in roughly 92 percent,108 77 percent,109 and 60 percent110 
of cases.) 
Table 1.  U.S. Supreme Court Cases, October Terms 1953–2006 
Unanimous 2347 
(38.3%) 
8–1 492 
(8%) 
7–2 625 
(10.2%) 
6–3 908 
(14.8%) 
 
 106. See infra Table 1: U.S. Supreme Court Cases, October Terms 1953–2006. 
 107. The Court decided 3,042 cases with no or one dissent, or 49.6 percent of all decisions. 
Id. 
 108. If two Justices dissent, then the probability that three-Justice panels will change the 
outcome is: Pr(d) = C7,1 / 84 = 7/84 or 8.33 percent. The formula reflects that both dissenting 
Justices would have to be on a three-Justice panel for it to reach a different outcome than the 
one reached by the en banc Court. Those two Justices could serve on a three-Justice panel with 
any one of the seven Justices in the majority. Hence, there are 7 panels, out of the 84 possible 
panels, that would produce a different outcome. 
 109. If three Justices dissent, then the probability that a three-Justice panel will change the 
outcome is: Pr(d) = ((C3,2) * (C6,1) + (C3,3)) / 84 = 19/84 = 22.62%. The formula reflects that a 
three-Justice panel will support a different outcome if it has two dissenting Justices and one 
majority Justice or all three dissenting Justices. The possible combinations of two dissent and 
one majority is the number of combinations of two dissenters out of a pool of three {(C3,2) = 3} 
times the number of majority Justices {(C6,1 ) = 6}, or 18 possible panels with two dissenters and 
one majority Justice. In addition, a panel would change the outcome if all three dissenters were 
on the panel. Thus, there are 19 panels that would reach a different outcome while 65 would 
reach the same outcome. 
 110. If four Justices dissent, then the probability that a three-Justice panel (k = 3) would 
produce a different outcome is: Pr(d) = ((C4, 3) * (C5,0) + (C4, 2) * (C5,1)) / C9,3 = ((4 *1) + (6 * 5)) /84 
= 34/84 = 17/42 = 40.48%. 
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5–4 982 
(16%) 
7–1 153 
(2.5%) 
6–2 241 
(3.9%) 
5–3 224 
(3.7%) 
Other 206 
(3.4%) 
Total 6133 
(100%) 
These data show that panel decisionmaking is unlikely to lead to 
outcomes that differ from those decided en banc, but they do not tell 
us exactly what percentage of cases would come out the same way 
under a panel system as under the system currently in place. To 
calculate such a figure, we examined the vote outcome in every case, 
and we considered every possible panel that could have been assigned 
(eighty-four in each case, given nine Supreme Court Justices111). We 
found that 87.4 percent of Supreme Court cases would have come out 
the same way if decided by a panel as by the Court as a whole. 
Table 2.  Effect of Using Panels on Case Outcomes: 1953–2006 Terms 
 All Cases Percentage decided 
the same way 
Number 
remaining the 
same 
Unanimous 2347 100.0% 2347 
8–1 492 100.0% 492 
7–2 625 91.7% 573 
6–3 908 77.4% 703 
5–4 982 59.5% 585 
7–1 153 100.0% 153 
6–2 241 89.3% 215 
5–3 224 71.4% 160 
 
 111. See supra note 108. 
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Other 206 87.9% 181 
Total 6133 87.4% 5363 
This analysis reveals that the Supreme Court would have reached 
the same result in nearly 90 percent of its prior cases whether it sat as 
a full Court or in three-Justice panels.112 Assuming Supreme Court 
behavior during the past half-century is predictive of Supreme Court 
behavior in the future, the analysis also suggests that the Court would 
reach vastly similar results in future cases whether sitting in panels or 
as a full Court.113 And, if the Court retained an en banc procedure for 
selected cases, the fear that panels would produce different decisions 
from the Court as a whole should dissipate, if not disappear entirely. 
C. Retain Limited En Banc Review 
 By expanding the size of the Court, and by deciding cases in 
panels, Congress can dramatically increase the decisionmaking 
capacity of the Court. If the Court retained and exercised the 
discretion to hear some cases en banc—either in the first instance or 
on review—it would reduce some of these capacity gains. 
Nonetheless, we advocate that Congress grant the Court authority to 
exercise en banc review because some cases, at least some of the time, 
may call for the Court to speak as a whole. 
 If Congress deprived the Court of the ability to act as a 
collective body, the Court might suffer a loss of institutional 
legitimacy in the eyes of at least some members of the public.114 Given 
the Court’s lack of enforcement power, its institutional legitimacy is 
 
 112. The foregoing results are not uniformly true across all issue areas because some areas 
are more likely than others to produce dissent. Still, even in highly divisive areas, such as 
criminal procedure or the First Amendment, three-Justice panels would have produced the 
same outcome in more than eight out of ten Supreme Court cases. 
 113. The composition of the Court’s docket might have changed under a panel system. To 
the extent that Justices consider the likely outcome if they vote to grant certiorari, the panel 
system changes a Justice’s estimates. For a discussion of the role of such strategic calculations in 
the certiorari process, see generally Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court 
Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson 
Court, 57 J. POL. 824, 829–36 (1995) (“While most justices appeared to grant certiorari when 
they disagreed with the lower court, the extent to which the predicted level of support they 
would receive on the merits mattered was dependent on whether they would affirm if the case 
were decided on the merits.”). 
 114. Other countries’ high courts act entirely through divisions or panels without an 
apparent loss in legitimacy. In the United Kingdom, for example, both the Privy Council and the 
House of Lords hear cases in panels, although panel size may grow in very important cases. 
United Kingdom, supra note 99, at 1697–700. 
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important, at least in those cases involving deeply controversial issues. 
To give effect to rulings desegregating the public schools,115 effectively 
deciding the winner of a presidential election,116 or prohibiting capital 
punishment in the states,117 the Court might need to stand together as 
a whole, even if the Justices are not fully in agreement with one 
another. 
 In thinking about Supreme Court decisionmaking approaches, 
four possibilities present themselves. The status quo, at one end of the 
spectrum, calls for the Court to decide all of its cases en banc. As we 
have indicated here and elsewhere, we reject this decisionmaking 
approach. At the other end of the spectrum, the Court could decide 
all of its cases in panels. The advantage of this “mandatory panels” 
approach is that it would enable the Court to capture all of the 
capacity gains associated with the move from a small en banc Court to 
a larger Court deciding in panels. The disadvantage to this approach, 
however, is that the Court would not have the discretion to decide 
key cases en banc, which might harm the Court’s legitimacy (although 
this does not seem to be a problem in at least some other countries118). 
For this reason, we reject this approach. Two “mixed” approaches to 
decisionmaking lie between the en banc–only approach at one end of 
the spectrum and the panels-only approach at the other end of the 
spectrum. One of these two approaches, the “discretionary panels” 
approach, calls for the Court to decide most cases en banc but 
authorizes the Court to decide specified cases in panels. The other 
approach, the “discretionary en banc” approach, calls for the Court to 
decide most cases in panels but authorizes the Court to decide cases 
en banc in those rare instances in which a majority of Justices so 
orders in response to a party’s suggestion or a Justice’s 
recommendation. We recommend that Congress adopt this latter 
approach, which mirrors decisionmaking on the U.S. courts of 
appeals,119 because it expands Court capacity substantially while 
retaining Court discretion to address unusually significant cases as a 
full body. 
 
 115. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 116. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000). 
 117. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
 118. See supra note 114. 
 119. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 333 (1941) (recognizing the power of 
circuits to sit en banc). 
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 If Congress enacted the discretionary en banc approach we 
advocate, when should the Court exercise its discretion to depart 
from its default approach of panel decisionmaking to hear a case en 
banc? The Court should—and in our view, would—hear only its most 
significant cases en banc. The statutory authorization should direct 
the Court to sit en banc to resolve challenges to the constitutionality 
of federal statutes, to overturn Court precedent, and to answer other 
questions of exceptional importance. 
 Determining what cases are most significant is a matter of some 
debate, but we believe two types of cases would fall into this category. 
First, we believe those cases in which the Court exercises judicial 
review, declaring an act unconstitutional, are among the most 
significant cases the Court decides.120 Since 1953, the Court has 
declared a statute unconstitutional 461 times, or in nearly 8 percent of 
all cases.121 Second, it seems likely that the Court would take the 
position, which is universal in the circuits, that any case in which the 
Court would overturn precedent is also significant and therefore 
worthy of en banc consideration.122 Since 1953, the Court has 
overturned precedent in only 134 cases or roughly 2 percent of the 
total number of cases. In light of prior decisions, then, we would 
expect the Supreme Court to sit en banc in approximately 10 percent 
of its cases under this discretionary en banc approach.123 We expect 
that the two cases we mentioned earlier—Bush v. Gore and Roe v. 
 
 120. Other countries’ high courts have singled out such cases for special treatment. For 
example, Australia’s court of last resort, which generally uses panels, usually sits en banc for 
cases involving the interpretation of the constitution. High Court of Australia, About the Court: 
Operation of the Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about_03.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
Cases which involve interpretation of the Constitution, or where the Court may be 
invited to depart from one of its previous decisions, or where the Court considers the 
principle of law involved to be one of major public importance, are normally 
determined by a full bench comprising all seven Justices if they are available to sit. 
Id. 
 121. Congress has ordered the courts of appeals to sit en banc when hearing challenges to 
the constitutionality of certain statutes. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437 
(2006). 
 122. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 699 n.20 (1995) (explaining that all courts of 
appeals follow a rule that panel rulings bind later panels unless overruled by the en banc circuit 
or the Supreme Court, although a few have an en banc bypass procedure). 
 123. This estimate is likely too high. If a panel system had been used in those earlier cases, 
the Justices on the panel might have been those who disagreed with the Court’s majority 
decision to overturn precedent. Thus, the panel would not have favored overruling and would 
not have automatically triggered full Court review. That review would have to wait for a later 
day when a panel of Justices in favor of such a change controlled the decision. 
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Wade—would have been heard en banc, in one instance because of 
the political importance (Bush v. Gore), and in the other because the 
constitutionality of a state statute was at issue (Roe v. Wade). 
 Under this approach, the Court should be able to keep an active 
panel docket while sitting en banc in a handful of important cases. 
This approach captures most of the efficiency gains of the mandatory 
panels approach; at the same time, it reduces the likelihood that 
panels will make decisions that fail to reflect the Court’s overall view. 
And it ensures that the Court chooses to act en banc in controversial 
or divisive cases. 
III.  PROPOSAL PROS AND CONS 
 We have argued that Congress should expand the Supreme 
Court’s decisionmaking capacity by remaking the Court in the image 
of the U.S. courts of appeals. By expanding the size of the Court, 
adopting panel decisionmaking, and retaining limited en banc review, 
Congress would give the Court the opportunity to dramatically 
expand its output, perhaps increasing the number of cases it decides 
each year by a factor of five. This increase in decisionmaking capacity 
would enable the Court to provide a check against the other branches 
and lower courts, to generate a more understandable and accurate 
body of law, and to ensure greater consistency in the laws that govern 
citizens across the country. 
 The Court has discretion over its docket, so we recognize that it 
might choose not to use the additional capacity our proposal would 
make available.124 In other words, Congress might expand the number 
of Justices from nine to fifteen and direct the Court to decide cases in 
panels, but the Court might choose to continue its practice of hearing 
fewer than one hundred cases per year. We think this unlikely. If the 
Court made this choice, Congress could require the Court to hear 
some minimum number of cases. We think this unlikely, too. 
Regardless, the three-pronged proposal we advance in this Article 
offers benefits, which we describe in Part III.A, even if the Court 
chooses not to use the extra decisionmaking capacity. Our proposal is 
 
 124. The Court is more likely to use the capacity in order to review decisions with which it 
disagrees. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An 
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 
102–14 (2000) (developing a model of Supreme Court auditing of lower courts based on likely 
agreement with lower court decisions and finding empirical support for the conclusion that the 
Court grants certiorari to review decisions with which it disagrees). 
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not without its flaws, as we acknowledge in Part III.B, but its upsides 
outweigh its downsides. 
A. Potential Benefits 
1. Credible Threat of Review.  The increased decisionmaking 
capacity afforded by our proposal would arm the Court with a more 
credible threat of review. Even assuming the Court continued to 
review only a small number of federal lower court and state high 
court rulings and congressional and administrative agency decisions, 
the cost of invalidation by the Court is sufficiently high that it 
magnifies any increase in the probability of Court action. Thus, 
increased capacity, even if unused, should incentivize lower courts 
and the other branches to toe the line, thereby minimizing shirking by 
the lower courts125 and overreaching by the other two branches.126 
2. Entry and Exit.  Our proposal would have salutary effects on 
both entry onto the Court and exit from the Court. With respect to 
the appointment and confirmation process, we would expect 
significantly fewer conflicts between the executive and legislative 
branches because in most instances, the stakes would be much lower 
due to the expanded size of the Court’s membership. If each Justice 
accounted for 6.7 percent of the Court’s total decisionmaking rather 
than 11 percent as at present, each Justice’s relative importance 
would decrease significantly (unless the Court is deadlocked on 
critical issues of concern to the president and Congress). 
 For the very same reason—that is, because each Justice would 
be relatively less important or influential on a larger Court that 
 
 125. See Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of 
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 673, 681–89 (1994) (finding that courts of appeals are responsive to Supreme Court 
doctrinal changes but will look for opportunities to further their own preferences); see also 
Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and 
the Rule of Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61, 62–67 (2003) (offering a formal model of 
Supreme Court auditing of lower courts). 
 126. See James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of 
Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84, 84, 97–98 (2001) (concluding, based on a 
formal model of court-legislature interaction, that “[t]he possibility of informative judicial 
review” affects the quantity and informational quality of legislation enacted by the legislature 
relative to legislation that would be enacted in the absence of judicial review); see also Andrew 
D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
361, 361, 370, 373–76 (2001) (finding, based on empirical evidence, that “the Supreme Court 
profoundly constrain[s] House members and senators when casting roll call votes”). 
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decides most cases in panels—we would expect more Justices to exit 
the Court in a timely fashion. Rather than calling for term limits or 
mandatory retirement (both of which likely pose constitutional 
problems), the simple expansion of the Court membership might 
address the widespread concerns that multiple commentators have 
voiced about Justices who simply stay on the Court too long for 
strategic (or self-important) reasons. 
3. Court Composition.  Because the confirmation stakes would be 
lower, and because turnover would likely be much higher, the 
president could take more risks in the appointment process. This, in 
turn, should lead to a more diverse bench. As of this writing, the 
bench is overwhelmingly white (88.9 percent), overwhelmingly male 
(88.9 percent), and overwhelmingly composed of Justices who sat 
previously on the U.S. courts of appeals (100 percent). We have no 
objection to whites (both of us are white), men (one of us is male), or 
prior courts of appeals Justices (alas, neither of us has served in this 
capacity), but we believe the Court could benefit from more Justices 
with different demographic characteristics and broader practice 
backgrounds. To take just one example, we think prior judicial 
experience is a very valuable attribute for a few of the Justices to 
possess, but it would also be desirable to have Justices on the Court 
who have significant experience in private business (Blackmun, for 
example), the elected branches (Warren and Black, for example), and 
the executive branch (Taft and Goldberg, for example). 
4. Court Cohesion.  We would also expect the larger Court to be 
less divided than the smaller Court. First, most cases would be 
decided by panels, thereby not involving the majority of the Court, 
preventing fractious decisions between essentially two halves of the 
Court. 
Second, even in en banc cases, the likelihood of a bare-majority 
outcome would be much lower, as a matter of simple mathematics, on 
a larger Court than on the current Court. While the Court will 
continue to hear close cases, both theoretically and empirically the 
minimum winning coalitions are less likely to occur. This means it is 
much less likely that one or two swing justices (a la Justice O’Connor 
or Justice Kennedy) would have disproportionate weight on the 
Court. 
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5. Judicial Education.  Finally, even if the Court opted not to 
exercise its expanded decisionmaking capacity to hear more appeals 
on its docket, it might use the additional capacity to acquaint itself 
with the lower courts and trial procedure. The Court could do this in 
three ways. 
First, the Court could play a more active role in its original 
jurisdiction docket. Under the Constitution, the Court has original 
jurisdiction “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”127 
Only the Court can hear controversies between states.128 When 
original jurisdiction cases are brought to the Justices, the Court 
appoints a special master to conduct the necessary trial work.129 
Instead of proceeding in this fashion in all cases, the Court could play 
this role by assigning its original jurisdiction cases to a panel or to an 
individual Justice. 
Second, Justices used to sit by designation in some district court 
cases. In so doing, the Justices could observe firsthand how lower 
courts interpret and implement higher Court rulings. By renewing this 
practice, the Justices could again become better acquainted with the 
courts they monitor. 
Third, Justices used to ride circuit to become familiar with the 
U.S. courts of appeals. This practice has largely died, but by 
expanding the Court’s decisionmaking capacity in the manner we 
propose in this Article, each individual Justice should have much 
more opportunity to ride circuit. 
By playing a more active role in the Court’s original jurisdiction 
docket, by sitting in district court cases by designation, and by riding 
circuit, the Justices would learn more about the lower courts they 
monitor and the trial court procedures they affect. This knowledge, in 
turn, should enable the Court to make better decisions as it goes 
 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also 28 U.S.C. §1251(b) (2006) (“The Supreme Court 
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceedings to which 
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All 
controversies between the United States and a State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State 
against the citizens of another State or against aliens.”). 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 129. See SUP. CT. R. 19 (outlining the procedure for original actions). Neither the statute nor 
the Court’s rules require appointing a special master for hearing evidence in original jurisdiction 
disputes. But the Court appears to have adopted that practice as reflected in the special master 
reports filed in every recent original jurisdiction case. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the U.S., 
Special Master Reports, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/SpecMastRpt/SpecMastRpt.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
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about its business. Thus, our three-pronged proposal might ultimately 
enhance the quality of the Court’s decisions. 
B. Potential Costs 
1. Legitimacy.  Our proposal raises two potential legitimacy 
concerns. First, some might question the Court’s legitimacy because 
of its expansion in size; if some find it troubling that the Court 
includes nine unelected members, they will find it even more 
disconcerting if the Court were to include fifteen unelected members, 
as advocated under our proposal. 
 This legitimacy concern does not trouble us for a couple of 
reasons. The U.S. courts of appeals have large, unelected 
memberships, and as far as we can tell, those courts and their 
decisions have ample legitimacy in the eyes of most members of 
society. And, as noted above, the expansion of the Supreme Court 
will erode the power of each individual Justice. Thus, although an 
expansion will increase the number of unelected officials serving on 
the high Court, each of them will enjoy less influence than is true at 
present. 
 The second legitimacy concern is more troubling. Some might 
question the Court’s legitimacy not because of its expansion in size 
but because it would, under our proposal, decide most cases in panels. 
As far as we can tell, however, panel decisionmaking has not 
undermined the legitimacy of high courts in other countries; high 
courts in the several states that authorize panel decisionmaking; or 
the U.S. courts of appeals, which decide most questions of federal 
law. 
2. Decision Quality.  Under our proposal, three Justices, rather 
than the Court as a whole, would decide most cases, but the Court as 
a whole—a group much larger than the current Court—would decide 
a fraction of cases en banc. Some might worry about the impact of 
group size on the Court’s decisions. Would panels produce inferior 
decisions because they are made up of three judges rather than nine? 
Would the en banc Court make inferior decisions because it is made 
up of fifteen rather than nine? The research on group decisionmaking 
is mixed, equivocal, and not directly relevant to appellate court 
decisionmaking. Nonetheless, it suggests that a larger Court might 
possess some decisionmaking advantages over a smaller Court and 
vice-versa. 
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The research indicates that larger groups generally possess what 
can be considered a “resource” advantage.130 They often have greater 
ability, expertise, energy, and diversity than smaller groups.131 They 
tend to deliberate longer than smaller groups,132 and they tend to 
outperform smaller groups on such tasks as “information-gathering 
and fact-finding” because such tasks “can be broken down into 
different components and specific subtasks [can be] allocated to 
different members of the group.”133 
Smaller groups, on the other hand, tend to have “process” 
advantages.134 Because they tend to be less complicated than larger 
groups,135 smaller groups tend to possess communication and 
coordination advantages,136 to be more cooperative,137 to be more 
 
 130. See, e.g., MARVIN E. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP 
BEHAVIOR 173–74 (3d ed. 1981) (identifying the resource advantages of large groups and the 
process advantages of small groups and concluding that “whether the [group] performance will 
become more or less effective as size increases will depend upon the degree to which added 
resources can be utilized and the degree to which group processes exert negative influence on 
group output”); Glenn E. Littlepage, Effects of Group Size and Task Characteristics on Group 
Performance: A Test of Steiner’s Model, 17 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 449, 449 (1991) (“The 
relationship between group size and group performance shows substantial variability across 
studies.”). 
 131. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 130, at 173 (observing that “the added resources that are 
available in larger groups (abilities, knowledge, range of opinions, etc.) contribute to effective 
group performance” and that larger groups “tend to be more diverse”); John M. Levine & 
Richard L. Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 415, 422 
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) (“As a group grows larger, it has access to more resources 
(e.g., the time, energy, and expertise of its members), so its performance ought to improve.”); 
Richard L. Moreland et al., Creating the Ideal Group: Composition Effects at Work, in 
UNDERSTANDING SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR: SMALL GROUP PROCESSES AND 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 11, 13 (E.H. Witte & J.H. Davis eds., 1996) (observing that larger 
groups “often perform better because they have access to more resources, including time, 
energy, money, and expertise”). 
 132. Based on a meta-analysis of jury size studies, Michael Saks and Mollie Weighner Marti 
found that “[t]welve-person juries spend more time in deliberation” than six-person juries. 
Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 451, 465 (1997). 
 133. DONALD C. PENNINGTON, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BEHAVIOUR IN SMALL 
GROUPS 79 (2002). 
 134. See supra note 130. 
 135. William M. Kephart, A Quantitative Analysis of Intragroup Relationships, 55 AM. J. 
SOC. 544, 544–49 (1950) (illustrating this proposition mathematically). 
 136. See, e.g., Levine & Moreland, supra note 131, at 422 (observing that “in larger groups, 
coordination losses are also more likely”); Moreland et al., supra note 131, at 13 (observing that 
larger groups “often experience coordination problems that can interfere with their 
performance”). 
 137. See, e.g., Axel Franzen, Group Size Effects in Social Dilemmas: A Review of the 
Experimental Literature and Some New Results for One-Shot N-PD Games, in SOCIAL 
G&G IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:06:04 PM 
1474 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1439 
cohesive,138 to avoid such problems as “social loafing” and free-riding 
among some group members,139 and to reach outcomes more 
expeditiously.140 Smaller groups, in short, tend to be more “effective at 
using information to come to a decision.”141 
 Collectively, the research suggests that our proposal might 
position the Court to take advantage of both smaller and larger group 
dynamics. Smaller groups appear to possess decisionmaking process 
advantages. Under our proposal, most Court business would be 
conducted in panels, allowing the Court to take advantage of this 
decisionmaking edge. Large groups appear to possess resource 
advantages, which might provide for a richer, if more complicated, 
decision environment. Under our proposal, the Court would retain 
discretion to decide important cases en banc, allowing the full 
resources of the Court as a whole to be brought to bear on these 
particularly significant issues.142 
3. Induced Certiorari.  Another potential concern is that our 
panel proposal might induce losing litigants to appeal. If the Court’s 
decisionmaking capacity expands by a factor of five, losing litigants 
 
DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION 117, 117, 132 (Ulrich Schulz et al. eds., 1994) (observing that it 
is “common knowledge in the social sciences that large groups show less cooperative behavior 
than small groups,” but finding, based on prisoner’s dilemma experiments, that this is true in 
repeat play games only); Moreland et al., supra note 131, at 14 (“There is more conflict among 
the members of larger groups, who are less likely to cooperate with one another.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 138. See, e.g., PENNINGTON, supra note 133, at 79 (“Larger groups, of say seven or more, do 
have a tendency to break down into smaller subgroups.”). 
 139. See, e.g., id. at 56–68 (observing that social loafing is more likely to be a problem as 
group size increases); Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic 
Review and Theoretical Integration, 65 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 700–02 (1993) (finding, 
using meta-analytic techniques, a positive correlation between group size and social loafing and 
noting various factors that can dampen it); Levine & Moreland, supra note 131, at 422 (noting 
that “motivation losses due to social loafing, free riding, and efforts to avoid exploitation” are 
more likely in larger groups). 
 140. See, e.g., PENNINGTON, supra note 133, at 79 (“Research shows that smaller groups, of 
between three and eight, are faster at completing tasks than are larger groups of 12 or more 
members.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. To be sure, we do not want to overstate the import of this research for the question we 
are exploring here. None of this research is based on Supreme Court Justices or judges 
generally, nor does any of it ask experimental subjects to perform the tasks that appellate judges 
perform—that is, review a record, digest legal briefs, preside over oral arguments, analyze and 
synthesize the information, reach a decision, and produce an opinion. Moreover, this research 
compares groups of varying sizes, often very small groups to quite large groups; only 
occasionally do researchers compare three-person groups to nine-person groups. 
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might estimate that the prospect that the Court will grant their cert 
petitions will also rise by a factor of five. In other words, a litigant’s 
probability of obtaining review by the Court rises. Because many 
losing litigants will perceive this in the same way, this could lead to a 
significant increase in cert petitions. In the same way that building 
more roads can induce more traffic, creating more opportunities for 
Supreme Court review might induce more cert petitions.143 
CONCLUSION 
 In this Article, we elaborate on our earlier work on Supreme 
Court decisionmaking by making three specific proposals. First, we 
argue that Congress should expand the Court so that it includes 
fifteen Justices. Second, we recommend that Congress adopt panel 
decisionmaking as the norm on the Supreme Court. Third, we 
recommend that Congress grant the Court discretionary en banc 
review according to which the Court can hear selected, significant 
cases en banc. This three-pronged approach, if embraced by 
Congress, would enable the Court to hear many more cases and 
thereby better fulfill its varied roles. Moreover, the proposal offers a 
number of benefits separate and apart from those associated with 
increased decisionmaking capacity, and collectively, these advantages 
outweigh the modest disadvantages associated with the proposal. 
Thus, we end where we began: Congress should remake the Supreme 
Court in the courts’ of appeals image. 
 
 143. For an analysis of induced litigation more generally, see Tracey E. George & Chris 
Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
